[ Kill Cords ]

On 7 November, three RIBS, Kestrel, Eagle, and Lanner had been involved in a corporate sea challenge event with guests embarked. The day finished at Lymington, and once the guests had disembarked, the driver of each boat prepared to return to Southampton. The three RIBS left Lymington at 1730, having called the company engineer to advise him of their ETA. About 10 minutes later, and as they were leaving the Lymington River, the RIB drivers were told over the radio that it was “all clear” to head home in formation. As they were low on fuel, and it was now dark, this would ensure they would remain in company by transiting three abreast or in-line astern.

They headed east along the Solent at between 20 and 25 knots and more or less in-line abreast, with Eagle slightly ahead of the others. As they approached Calshot, it became obvious that Eagle was accelerating away. Despite radio calls for her to rejoin the formation, and the other two RIBS increasing speed, she continued to pull away. By the time Kestrel and Lanner had rounded Calshot Spit to the west of the main shipping channel, and were approaching the Fawley jetties, Eagle had pulled away. She was in the middle of the channel and travelling fast. Although displaying the correct navigational lights, her rear light had become indistinguishable from the background lights of Southampton.

By now, wake from large vessels was causing difficulties to both Kestrel and Lanner, prompting them to slow down and alter course to remain safe. They also lost sight of Eagle, and subsequent attempts to contact her driver by radio, or mobile phone, failed. Concerned for his safety, they crossed the shipping channel at 90°to see if he was on the other side, possibly having “stalled.”

They did not find him, so began a search down to the River Itchen, and back up Southampton Water; maintaining contact with their base by radio. They were then informed that a RIB had gone aground at Hamble Point, so headed in that direction. They found a coastguard helicopter monitoring the situation, while a coastguard RIB was pulling a casualty out of the water some 400 meters from where the grounding had occurred.

When a search was made for the RIB, it was found in the Hamble Point car park after it had hit the boulder sea defences at speed and launched itself into the air. The throttle arm was at half to two thirds power, with the ignition key and kill-cord still in place and in the “on” position.

Eagle’s driver knew the Solent well, and the track he had taken on this occasion was done in the best interests of safety. He had, however, become caught in the wash from commercial traffic in Southampton Water. Although he had slowed down to 30 knots, his craft pitched so violently that it threw him overboard and into the middle of the shipping lane. He inflated his lifejacket, but the weight of his clothes and boots made flotation difficult. Wash from passing traffic made swimming difficult, and it was only when a sailing vessel, coming up Southampton Water, noticed him that he was rescued. After a brief check-up in hospital, he was released -shaken but unharmed.

The Lessons

Eagle’s driver was experienced and well qualified. He was an RYA Powerboat instructor with an advanced driver ability, an RYA Yachtmaster Ocean in Sail and Power, and an RYA Yachtmaster instructor in Sail. As the MAIB has noticed on many previous occasions, small craft accidents often involve people who would appear to satisfy all criteria for qualification and experience. We also notice how often something goes wrong right at the end. So what can be learned?

1. Qualifications and experience do NOT guarantee a safe and sensible approach to boat operations.
2. Travelling in company in such conditions is both sensible and seamanlike but, to be really effective, coxswains or drivers should be constantly aware of what the others are doing.
3. No matter who or what you are, you MUST follow standard agreed procedures and instructions. If you do not, you not only place yourself at risk but also everybody else involved.
4. Speed at sea, like on the roads, can be a killer – your speed MUST be judged according to the conditions.
5. The loading and condition of the boat must be checked before you set out, and a judgement made as to what effect this will have on its operating characteristics.
6. Above all else, the Killcord must be firmly and correctly attached to the driver’s harness. The whole point of this is to STOP THE ENGINE in the event the driver falls out or becomes thrown backwards. If you do not do this, there is a strong possibility that the boat will circle and run you down. High-speed propellers can do an awful lot of damage to skin and bone!
7. Give very careful thought to your choice of lifejacket and clothing. Heavy boots and other gear can create enormous problems to people trying to keep their heads above water, especially in rough conditions. To survive, you need equipment which will keep you afloat, is warm, and lets people find you easily.

Footnote

Tiredness might also have had an influence in this accident. After a long and demanding day, a trip back through busy shipping lanes, particularly at night, can be very demanding. The natural tendency is to want to get home as quickly as possible, but judgement at night is a totally different thing to that experienced during the day. Planning an adventure exercise for the clients is one thing, considering the effects on the boat operators is another.

Reproduced by kind permission of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch.